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the flagrancy of the illegality, that led the court to bar the tainted evidence at
trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Edmons analyzed the facts of an illegal arrest, an illegal line-up, and sub-
sequent in-court identification. The court resolved the problem through Wong
Sun's poisonous tree doctrine such that the Wade problem was never really
encountered. Because the illegal arrest was the primary illegality, the court
properly chose to take this direction.
Two significant factors, clouded by the court's intermingling of Wade and
Wong Sun terminology throughout the opinion, are revealed upon close scru-
tiny of the case. The first factor was the emergence of both the Wong Sun
and Wade factors in a single case and the court's reliance on Wong Sun such
that the Wade problem was never really encountered. The court extended
this line of reasoning to require a distinct independent source exception to purge
the taint caused by the illegal arrest, refusing to apply the same independent
source that purged the taint caused by the illegal line-up. However, the court
recognized a second significant factor that may have undermined the inde-
pendent source exception had it been established. This factor, the flagrant
arrest, may have been the determining consideration in the court's decision.
It initially appeared as a contributing factor to establish the exploitation re-
quirement of the "fruits" doctrine. However, the court noted that the flagrant
nature of the pretextual arrest for the purpose of exhibiting the accused before
the victim was particularly offensive and ventured beyond the mere exploitation
requirement of the "fruits" doctrine. The court concluded that had the "fruits"
doctrine not operated in Edmons to bar the testimony from trial, the evidence
would have most certainly been barred simply because of the flagrant illegality
of the arrest. Hence, the importance of Edmons, which future cases may re-
veal, is that it places greater emphasis on the flagrant arrest. Perhaps it will
merge with the "fruits" doctrine to satisfy the doctrine's exploitation require-
ment or perhaps it will rise as a doctrine itself to independently employ the
exclusionary rule as a device to protect fourth amendment rights.
Bob Harrison
Granting Poverty Workers Access to
Farmworkers Housed on Private Property
The complainant landowner was a farmer who seasonally employed migrant
farmworkers and also provided housing for them at a camp on his property.
The defendants were an attorney employed by a federally funded nonprofit
corporation which was designed to provide legal advice and representation to
farm laborers, and a field worker employed by a federally funded nonprofit
corporation designed to provide health services for such laborers.' The defend-
'Both corporations were funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Camden Re-
gional Legal Services, Inc., the attorney's employer, was funded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S
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ants entered the complainant's property to provide specific legal and medical
services for certain workers who were in need of their assistance. The defend-
ants also took this opportunity to bring to the farmworkers free literature con-
cerning available federally funded services for which they were eligible. The
complainant confronted them and, on learning their purpose, offered to sum-
mon both workers. The complainant insisted, however, that the legal consulta-
tion take place in his office and in his presence. The defendants rejected this
offer and maintained that they had the right to speak privately with the farm-
workers. The complainant then demanded that the defendants leave his prop-
erty and, on their refusal to do so, he executed formal complaints charging
them with violations of the New Jersey criminal trespass statute.2 The defend-
ants were convicted in the municipal and county courts. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey certified their appeal before argument in the appellate division.
Held, reversed and remanded: The property right of the farmer-employer may
not be so extended as to deny workers housed on his property the opportunity
of receiving aid from federal, state, local, or charitable agencies, and visitation
by representatives of such agencies, by members of the press, and by other per-
sons of the worker's choice, is not conduct within the reach of the criminal tres-
pass statute. State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS
Anglo-American law has traditionally held a special regard for property
rights.2 Blackstone referred to a property right as "that sole and despotic do-
minion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."4
Despite such early references to the absoluteness of property rights, restrictions
upon these rights seem to have been recognized in many instances. "All rights
tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are
limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those
on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to
hold their own when a certain point is reached."' Some well-known limitations
on property rights are zoning laws, principles of riparian rights, nuisance law,
and other principles that seem to square nicely with another Blackstonian pre-
2809(a) (3) (1971). Southwest Citizens Organization for Poverty Elimination, the medical
worker's employer, was funded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2861-64 (1971). For a discussion
of these statutes see notes 32 and 33 infra, and accompanying text.
2N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:170-31 (1951).
4See generally Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-in: Evolving Property Concepts, 44 B.U.L. REV.435 (1964).
4 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. Blackstone's view of property rights seems to
have been rather expansive. "So great moreover is the regard of the law for private prop-
erty, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of
the whole community." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. The preceding language
was quoted with approval in an early American decision, which added that "[iln a govern-
ment like ours, theories of public good or public necessity may be so plausible, or even so
truthful, as to command popular majorities. But whether truthful or plausible merely, and
by whatever numbers they are assented to, there are some absolute private rights beyond
their reach, and among these the constitution places the right of property." Wynehamer v.
People, 13 N.Y. 378, 386-87 (1856).
5 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
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cept-sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.' Such limitations on the use of pri-
vate property have been termed "a branch of what is called the police power
of the State."' Many of these limitations have become as basic to the common
law as property rights themselves. In examining the history of property rights,
"one sees a change from the viewpoint that he who owns may do as he pleases
with what he owns, to a position... which grudgingly, but steadily, broadens
the recognized scope of social interest in the utilization of things."8
Apart from these traditional limitations on property rights, there has lately
arisen a recognition that property rights and state action incident to their pro-
tection should not be applied so as to limit the exercise of certain personal free-
doms. In Martin v. City of Struthers' the defendant was convicted for door-to-
door distribution of religious literature in violation of a city ordinance pro-
hibiting all such distribution. The United States Supreme Court held that the
ordinance was unconstitutional in that it violated the defendant's first amend-
ment rights to freedom of speech and press, which the Court held to include
both the right to receive and the right to distribute literature."0 "Freedom to dis-
tribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly
vital to the preservation of a free society that.., it must be fully preserved.""
The Court had previously made clear that a state or city could not completely
bar the distribution of literature on its streets or sidewalks," but Martin extend-
ed the concept to prohibit laws forbidding private, or door-to-door, solicitation.
A further inroad was made in Marsh v. Alabama.3 In that case the defendant
was convicted for violating a state criminal trespass law after distributing litera-
ture on the premises of a company town against the management's wishes. In
reversing the conviction, the Court noted that "[o]wnership does not always
mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."1' The
Court thus held that under these circumstances the state trespass law could not
be used to enforce the curtailment of first amendment freedoms. In this way
the owner's property rights were again limited, at least to the extent that his
property was "dedicated" to public use."
The property rights of landowning employers have been restricted by a num-
ber of cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act.6" Some of these
6 "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217. The maxim has been characterized as "mere verbiage"
and as "a sound moral precept expressing an ideal never fully attained in the social state."
Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627, 629 (1934).
'Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
05 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 494 (1949).
9319 U.S. 141 (1943).
"Id. at 143.
I11d.
1" See Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
13326 U.S. 501 (1946).14 Id. at 506.
18 Marsh was evidently the first case in which the Court relied upon the now familiar
"public function" argument.
1029 U.S.C. 5§ 151-68 (1970).
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decisions are similar to Martin and Marsh in that they seem to have been de-
cided primarily on constitutional grounds." However, most appear to be practi-
cal reconciliations between the mandates of the labor statutes and the employers'
property rights. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,' the Supreme Court
recognized that employees could engage in union organizational activity on
company property." No constitutional questions were discussed, the Court
describing its decision as one "working out an adjustment between the undis-
puted right of self-organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act
and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their
establishments."" The right of access to company property was extended to non-
employee union organizers in NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp."5 The ra-
tionale for this extension was that because the employees lived in an isolated
lumber camp, they would not otherwise have been able to meet with union rep-
resentatives. Again disregarding constitutional questions, the court seemed to
base its decision on the policy motive of allowing free exercise of the "rights
guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act." The right of nonemployee
access to company property was again extended in NLRB v. S. & H. Grossing-
er's, Inc.," in which the employees were quartered on the premises of a secluded
resort hotel. The court explained:
Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the National
Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two
must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other .... But when the inaccessibility of employees makes
ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with
them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been
required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information
on the right to organize."
Thus, the labor cases dealing with property rights make clear that employers'
property rights may be limited by the operation of federal labor laws." These
"See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968). Here also the "public function" argument was advanced by the Court.
18324 U.S. 793 (1945).
9 The specific holding was limited to situations in which a company rule against such
activity is "an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory
in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary" for maintain-
ing "production or discipline." Id. at 804 n.10.
" Id. at 797-98. The court also cited with approval the following language from the de-
cision of the National Labor Relations Board.
As the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held, 'It is not
every interference with property rights that is within the Fifth Amendment
... . Inconvenience, or even some dislocation of property rights, may be
necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining.' The Board
has frequently applied this principle in decisions involving varying sets of
circumstances, where it has held that the employer's right to control his prop-
erty does not permit him to deny access to his property to persons whose
presence is necessary there to enable the employees effectively to exercise their
right to self-organization and collective bargaining, and in those decisions
which have reached the courts, the Board's position has been sustained.
Id. at 802 n.8.
' 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).
"Id. at 151.
" 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
2
4 Id. at 30.
2 For discussions of these cases see Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Com-
pany Property, 18 VAND. L. REv. 73 (1964); Hanley, Union Organization on Company
NOTES1971]
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decisions do not depend on any assertion of first amendment freedoms. Further-
more, they do not appear to have been based on the federal supremacy clause."
Instead these decisions, based primarily on policy considerations, simply seem
to be practical reconciliations between conflicting laws.
II. HELPING THE HELPLESS: MIGRANT FARM LABOR
The day-to-day existence of migrant farmworkers in the United States has
been described as one involving great physical effort, deplorable working con-
ditions, and inadequate compensation."
A migrant camp is a microcosm of nearly every social ill, every injustice, and
everything shameful in our society: poverty almost beyond belief, rampant di-
sease and malnutrition, racism, filth and squalor, pitiful children drained of
pride and hope, exploitation and powerlessness, and the inability or unwilling-
ness of public and private institutions, at all levels, to erase this terrible blight
on our country.2
The specific causes of the destitution of the migrant farmworker are many; but
until recently perhaps chief among them has been his almost total exclusion
from the provisions of any beneficial social legislation." "Simply put, migrant
farm workers are not enjoying the minimal legal protections afforded other
workingmen today.""2 They are often isolated from the balance of our culture
by race, language, and illiteracy."s By necessity migrants and their families are
usually forced to live on their employer's property, thus further isolating them
from the community.
These flagrant conditions have not gone unnoticed by Congress. Legislation
has been passed "to assist migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their families
to improve their living conditions and develop skills necessary for a productive
and self-sufficient life in an increasingly complex and technological society."
32
Property-A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266 (1958); Note, "Not as a
Stranger": Non-employee Union Organizers Soliciting on Company Property, 65 YALE
L.J. 423 (1956).
'6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. While few cases in this area have been specifically based on
the supremacy clause, the language of at least one Supreme Court case would seem to en-
courage such an approach. It has been asserted that a state law cannot "(stand) as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
"
TSee, e.g., Chase, The Migrant Farm Worker in Colorado-The Life and the Law, 40
U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1967).
"8Hearings on Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness Before the Subcomm.
on Migratory Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st &
2d Sess., pt. 8-A, at 4979 (1970).
9 SUBCOMM. ON MIGRATORY LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, THE MIGRATORY FARM LABOR PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No.
1006, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1968). It has been vigorously contended that the federal
labor statutes should be amended to include farm employees. Note, The Farm Worker: His
Need for Legislation, 22 ME. L. REV. 213 (1970). The constitutionality of the exemption
of agricultural workers from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act has been
seriously questioned. Comment, The Constitutionality of the NLRA Farm Labor Exemption,
19 HASTINGS L.J. 384 (1968). For an analysis of the housing problems of migrant labor
and the adequacy of the legislative response, see Comment, Laws and Legislation Providing
for the Housing of Migrant Agricultural Workers, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 111 (1970).
' Spriggs, Access of Visitors to Labor Camps on Privately Owned Property, 21 U. FLA.
L. REV. 295, 297 (1969).
" Lorenz, The Application of Cost-Utility Analysis to the Practice of Law: A Special
Case Study of the California Farmworkers, 15 KAN. L. REV. 409, 421 (1967).
"Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2861 (1971).
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Programs are now authorized "to meet the immediate needs of migrant and
seasonal farmworkers and their families, such as day care for children, educa-
tion, health services, improved housing and sanitation (including the provision
and maintenance of emergency and temporary housing and sanitation facili-
ties), legal advice and representation, and consumer training and counseling.""3
It seems clear that any such attempts to improve the lot of migrant farm-
workers will bring into conflict the dominion of the owner over his labor camps
and the need and desire of the workers to receive information and services at
the camps where they work and live.' The specific questions of the right of
farmworkers to receive visitors and the right of poverty workers and others to
enter labor camps have not been extensively litigated, although there are
several "access" cases now pending.' It has been held, however, that a news-
paper reporter could not be prohibited from entering a migrant camp and,
therefore, could not be convicted of trespass for his refusal to leave the premi-
ses." This holding was based upon both the reporter's right to freedom of the
press and the migrants' rights to free access to information. The court stated
that the migrants "have under our Constitution a right to free access to infor-
mation and, most certainly, visitors, such as news reporters, may not be denied
without good cause shown the right of reasonable visitation for purposes of
gathering and disseminating news."'" However, the court drew "a sharp dis-
tinction... between private property used solely for the owner's private pur-
poses, where the owner's right to protection against criminal trespass and from
invasion of his constitutional right to privacy, will take precedence, and premi-
ses which are clearly open and dedicated to public uses."' Hence, the opinion
relied to some degree on the "public function" argument." While this decision
may indicate the reasoning that will be used by some courts in deciding cases
of this nature, because of the lack of precedent in this area, it cannot be said
that any rule of law or trend of authority has been established."0
III. FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES-STATE V. SHACK
Writing on a clean slate in State v. Shack,"' the Supreme Court of New Jet-
"Id. § 2862(b) (1).
3' "All attempts to assist the migrant farmworkers must initially address the basic prob-
lem of securing for outsiders-health inspectors, O.E.O. funded employees, community or
other organizers-access to the residential migrant camps." Hearings on Migrant and Sea-
sonal Farmworker Powerlessness, supra note 28, at 5255.
"Citations to these cases are collected in Sherman & Levy, Free Access to Migrant
Labor Camps, 57 A.B.A.J. 434 (1971). In a somewhat analogous situation, a nursing home
has been temporarily restrained from interfering with its patients' rights to receive visitors
who seek to assist them and inform them of their constitutional and statutory benefits and
rights. Health Law Project v. Sarah Allen Nursing Home, Civil No. 71-1795 (E.D. Pa.,
temporary restraining order filed Sept. 2, 1971).
3'People v. Rewald, 65 Misc. 2d 453, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga County Ct. 1971).
'1318 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
38 Id.
39 It seems unfortunate for the cause of the migrant that the court based its decision on
the public nature of the particular camp in question, since there are many other camps that
are isolated and quite private in nature.
"0In MICH. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. 4727 (1971) an extensive analysis of the question
led the attorney general to conclude that migrant farmworkers were constitutionally entitled
to receive visitors and that the state criminal trespass statute could not be invoked by owners
to prevent the entry of any visitors.
41 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
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sey was presented with a variety of reasons for holding in favor of the defend-
ants. It was urged that the migrant farmworkers should be considered as tenants
at will during the course of their employment, and thus entitled to choose and
receive any visitors they so desired.' It seems to be settled at common law that,
in the absence of any express or implied lease provision to the contrary, a ten-
ant has the right to receive visitors of his choice even when the owner objects,
and that the visitors also are entitled to enter the tenant's premises." New Jersey
has accepted this common-law concept," but before it can be applied to a situa-
tion, it must first appear that there exists a valid landlord-tenant relationship. In
cases in which an employee lives on the premises of his employer, however, the
New Jersey courts have consistently refused to find that a tenancy exists. Instead
it has been held that the relationship is one of master-servant, and that the
landowner remains in control of his property.' Although there has never been
a case specifically dealing with migrant workers, the consistent prior treatment
of similar employment situations in New Jersey as master-servant relationships
would seem to indicate that neither a tenancy nor the concomitant rights in the
tenant would be recognized. In rebutting the argument that the migrants were
tenants at will, the court merely stated that the cases cited "did not reach em-
ployment situations at all comparable with the one before us."'
Another argument made by the defendants was that the supremacy clause de-
manded that the state criminal trespass statute yield in favor of the mandate of
the federal Economic Opportunity Act. ' Whenever a state law conflicts with
or inhibits the operation of federal laws, the supremacy clause requires a finding
that the application of the state law is invalid." Chief Justice Marshall con-
sidered it "of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action
within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate gov-
ernments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence."' Also, if
it could be found that the defendants were officers of the federal government,
there is authority to the effect that the supremacy clause would prevent the use
of local laws to impede the performance of their official duties." No case has
as yet held the employees of nonprofit corporations like those involved in Shack
to be federal officers. The court refused to consider any of these supremacy
clause arguments; it was pointed out that they are "not established by any de-
finitive holding."'"
Perhaps the most vigorous assertion by the defendants was that the first
amendment rights of the defendants and the migrant farmworkers were sub-
stantially inhibited by the operation of the trespass statute, and that it was,
4"Brief for Appellants at 26, State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
13See, e.g., Williams v. Lubbering, 73 N.J.L. 317, 63 A. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
44Id.
'See, e.g., Scottish Rite Co. v. Salkowitz, 119 N.J.L. 558, 197 A. 43 (Sup. Ct. 1938);
McQuade v. Emmons, 38 N.J.L. 397 (Sup. Ct. 1876); Schuman v. Zurawell, 24 N.J. Misc.
180, 47 A.2d 560 (Cir. Ct. 1946).
41277 A.2d at 374.
47Brief for Appellants at 17, State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971).
"McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. 415 (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4U/d. at 434.
"
0 See, e.g., Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
873 (1958); In re Fair, 100 F. 149 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900).
11 277 A.2d at 371.
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therefore, unconstitutional. 2 Reliance was placed on Marsh v. Alabamas and
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
In answer to this argument the court observed that those cases were based upon
the public nature of the property involved.' The migrant camp in Shack was
essentially private in nature, and the "public function" argument of Marsh
would, thus, seem inapplicable.
The court chose instead to hold simply that the possessory right of the
farmer-employer had not been invaded by the defendants' conduct, which was,
thus, held to be beyond the reach of the trespass statute. The court found
no legitimate need for a right in the farmer to deny the worker the opportunity
for aid available from federal, State, or local services, or from recognized chari-
table groups seeking to assist him. Hence representatives of these agencies and
organizations may enter upon the premises to seek out the worker at his living
quarters. So, too, the migrant worker must be allowed to receive visitors there
of his own choice, so long as there is no behavior hurtful to others, and mem-
bers of the press may not be denied reasonable access to workers who do not
object to seeing them."M
It was recognized, however, that the employer might under certain circum-
stances bar peddlers, and that he might require visitors to identify themselves
and state their purposes. The court reached its holding through a practical in-
quiry into the plight of farmworkers in New Jersey, an examination of the
remedial legislation intended for their benefit, and an historical analysis of prop-
erty rights and limitations thereon. Taking this approach, the court, thus, found
it "unthinkable that the farmer-employer can assert a right to isolate the mi-
grant worker in any respect significant for the worker's well-being."5"
IV. CONCLUSION
By its decision in Shack the Supreme Court of New Jersey has secured for
New Jersey migrant farmworkers and their potential visitors broad access rights
that will likely greatly facilitate the operation of private and governmental
schemes designed to aid the farmworkers. The decision does not rest on any
precedent, constitutional or otherwise; it is rather a practical balancing of prop-
erty and personal rights. The peculiar reasoning of the court was that "a de-
cision in nonconstitutional terms is more satisfactory, because the interests of
migrant workers are more expansively served in that way than they would be
if they had no more freedom than these constitutional concepts could be found
to mandate if indeed they apply at all... 8 While judicial conservatives may de-
plore such a "policy" decision for its lack of underlying precedent, the court
probably was correct in feeling that the holding would have been more limited
if it had been based on any one of the arguments advanced by the defendants.
52 Id.
53 326 U.S. 501 (1946). For a discussion of Marsh see notes 13-15 supra, and accom-
pannng text.
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
1277 A.2d at 371.
" Id. at 374.




If the decision had been based on the supremacy clause, access rights would
have been achieved only for employees of federal or federally-funded agencies,
and possibly only when the employees could be regarded as "officers" of the
federal government. "
In order for the court to base its holding on the Marsh "public function"
argument,"' it would have been necessary either to extend the doctrine to prop-
erty not public in nature or else find as a fact that the migrant camp involved
was public in nature. Even if the court had so applied Marsh, access rights
would have been secured only for those wishing to enter the property to exer-
cise protected freedoms. Another reason it is fortunate that the Marsh argument
was rejected in Shack is that many migrant camps are essentially private in
nature, and Shack, thus, would not have been applicable to them.
The court also properly rejected the argument that the migrants were tenants
at will. To find that the migrants were tenants, the court would have had to
overturn a long and consistent line of New Jersey cases holding, in similar em-
ployment situations, that the relationship is one of master-servant and not land-
lord-tenant.' Even if the migrants were recognized as tenants, it would seem
that the farmer-employer could simply require the execution of a lease agree-
ment reserving to him the right to control visitors.
While Shack may have achieved, in a broad fashion, the needed access rights
for migrant workers in New Jersey, it may be questioned to what extent the
decision will be looked to by other jurisdictions in similar fact situations. The
complete lack of a constitutional holding makes uncertain what value the de-
cision will have as general precedent in future cases involving migrant farm-
worker access rights.,' Other courts may well be reluctant to follow a decision
based solely on general policy considerations. Had the decision been based on
some constitutional ground, it would have been more limited in its application,
as discussed above, but its value as solid precedent for other jurisdictions would
have been enhanced. Strictly speaking, the case seems to stand only for the
proposition that, in the particular circumstances involved, there was no trespass.
An alternative method by which the defendants' rights could have been vin-
dicated without a specific constitutional holding was available to the court.
Reasoning by analogy to the labor cases involving access rights,' the court
could have found that there was an implied right of access contained in the
mandate of the Economic Opportunity Act." Effective implementation of the
" See notes 47-50 supra, and accompanying text.
60See notes 52-54 supra, and accompanying text.
61 See the cases cited in note 45 supra.
62 State v. Shack has been cited with approval in another access case which, however,
bases its holding on common law tenancy and constitutional rights arguments. Folgueras v.
Hassle, Civil No. 252, and United States v. Hassle, Civil No. K 26-71 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
This action was the first access case to be prosecuted by the United States Department of
Justice. Sherman, supra note 35, at 437 n.16.
63 See, e.g., note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
"This seems to have been the contention of the United States. Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 12, State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). The in-
terest of the United States was stated as follows:
The United States has important responsibilities for ensuring that its pro-
grams operate effectively and without interference. Because this litigation,
among other things, involves an interpretation of federal legislation authoriz-
ing the creation of organizations designed to aid migratory and seasonal farm
[Vol. 25
